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Abstract  
The application of information theory to the measurement of income inequality has yielded an impressive array 
of measurement techniques known as Generalized Entropy (GE) measures.  Special cases of this class of index 
include Theil’s T and L measures which are considered axiomatically superior to other types of metrics 
including the popular Gini coefficient.  In this paper we show that the parallel between information theory and 
inequality measurement has not yet been fully explored and propose a new inequality measure based upon this 
concept.  The proposed measure is already established as a tool for use in statistical classification and signal 
processing problems and is known in these fields as the J-Divergence or Symmetric Kullback-Leibler 
Divergence. As an inequality metric the measure is shown to be axiomatically complete and is in possession of 
an additional property allowing for an alternate type of decomposition analysis.  The new type of decomposition 
makes the contribution of any individual or subgroup to the inequality metric directly observable such that the 
overall index may be reconciled with a weighted sum of each group contribution.   We illustrate with an 
example using income micro-data from the United States where we evaluate the contributions of various racial 
groups to overall inequality.  We also provide a standard decomposition of the inequalities between and within 
the racial groups to contrast the techniques. 
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The application of information theory to the measurement of income inequality has 
yielded an impressive array of measurement techniques known as Generalized Entropy 
(GE) measures.  Special cases of this class of index include Theil’s T and L measures 
which are considered axiomatically superior to other types of metrics including the 
popular Gini coefficient.  In this paper we show that the parallel between information 
theory and inequality measurement has not yet been fully explored and propose a new 
inequality measure based upon this concept.  The proposed measure is already 
established as a tool for use in statistical classification and signal processing problems 
and is known in these fields as the J-Divergence or Symmetric Kullback-Leibler 
Divergence. As an inequality metric the measure is shown to be axiomatically complete 
and is in possession of an additional property allowing for an alternate type of 
decomposition analysis.  The new type of decomposition makes the contribution of any 
individual or subgroup to the inequality metric directly observable such that the overall 
index may be reconciled with a weighted sum of each group contribution.   We illustrate 
with an example using income micro-data from the United States where we evaluate the 
contributions of various racial groups to overall inequality.  We also provide a standard 







Much of the groundwork for our understanding of the relationship between entropy and 
the measurement of inequality was laid out in a famous book by Theil (1967).  The work 
applied concepts from information theory to the distribution of income to develop two 
intuitive indices for the measurement of inequality. The more widely used measure 
became known as Theil’s ‘T measure’, the less common index is referred to as the ‘L 
measure’. The intuition behind the T measure is of particular interest and is well 
illustrated with the following thought experiment: Suppose we have a small group of 
people where each person has some non-negative quantity of money, and at least one 
person has a positive quantity. If one dollar were to be randomly selected from the total 
holdings of the group, we may ask ‘how surprised do we expect to be, on average, when 
we learn that the selected dollar belongs to a particular person?’     2
 
We can see that this thinking can lead us to an intuitive method for measuring equality.  
If one individual earns all the money we would not be at all surprised to learn that that 
person owned the randomly selected dollar.  Thus it may be said that the expected 
information content (or level of surprise) contained in a draw from such a distribution is 
zero as we could have anticipated that individual’s selection with certainty. Now suppose 
that each person has the same amount of money. If a dollar were to be randomly selected 
from this distribution we would have no a priori inclination as to whom it would likely 
belong to.  Thus prior to the draw we would expect a high level of surprise when we learn 
the identity of the owner of the mystery dollar and the information content of this 
distribution is at its extremum.  It should be clear that the first example (where the 
information content of the distribution is zero) coincides with our notion of perfect 
inequality, while in the second case, where information content is maximized, the 
incomes are perfectly equal.  Thus the information content of such a distribution gives us 
a sense of the equality of money within the distribution, which may be converted to a 
measure of inequality with some simple algebraic manipulations.    
 
The insight into this parallel between information theory and inequality measurement and 
the usefulness of the resultant techniques encouraged a flurry of related research. Cowell 
(1977) in particular formalized the use of a broad class of information theoretic 
techniques known as Generalized Entropy indices for the measurement of inequality, 
showing that several prominent measures including Theil’s indices could be expressed as 
special cases of a broader class of measure.  Furthermore the decomposability (Cowell 
and Kuga, 1981a), (Bourguignon, 1979) and axiomatic superiority of these measures 
(Cowell and Kuga, 1981b), (Foster, 1983) (Shorrocks, 1982) led to their widespread 
implementation in empirical works.  Prominent applied pieces using these techniques and 
their ordinal equivalents (Atkinson, 1978) include studies by Sala-i-Martin (2006), Sala-i-
Martin (2002), Milanovic (2002) and Chotikapanich et al. (1997).   
 
The purpose of this paper is to plot a similar course taken by the above authors for the 
development of a new measure of inequality based on the concept of entropy/information 
theory.  We set out in section 2 by reviewing some concepts in information theory and 
show how they may be used to develop a new inequality index.  In section 3 the axioms 
of inequality measurement are presented and it is shown that the new index is 
axiomatically complete. In section 4 we discuss an alternative method for decomposition 
analysis which allows the researcher to measure the extent to which any arbitrarily 
defined subgroup contributes to the overall inequality metric. We investigate the 
relationship between the proposed method and the standard decomposition technique for 
separating inequality into between-group and within-group estimates in section 5.  Lastly 
in section 6 we demonstrate the new measure and decomposition technique using income 
data for various U.S. racial groups. 
 
 
2. INFORMATION THEORY AND INEQUALITY 
   3
To review some basic principles from information theory we consider a set of n possible 
events  n E E E ... , 2 1  with associated probabilities of occurrence( ) n p p p ,... , 2 1 .  The events 
are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive such that exactly one will occur.  This 
implies 
 







1        0 ≥ i p             n i ... 1 =  
 
Suppose event  i E  occurs and we wish to assign an information (surprise) level (h) to this 
occurrence based on the probability i p . To do so we must specify an ‘information 
function’ for  () p h  to map the probability of each event to the real line. Generally we 
would require any candidate for this function to be non-negative and downward sloping 
over the unit interval, such that only positive information contents exist and that the more 
probable an event, the less information we gain by observing it.  We may also insist that 
() ∞ = 0 h  and  () 0 1 = h (impossible events bring infinite information and certain events 
yield no information) and that there is additivity in the case of independent events i.e.  
() ( ) ( ) 2 1 2 1, p h p h p p h + = .   Such conditions impose a logarithmic specification for the 
information function of the form  ( ) ( ) p p h ln − =  (see Theil, 1967).  This implies that the 
information content of our specific event i E  is  ( ) ( ) i i p p h ln − =  and that the expected, a 
priori information content of the distribution may be written as the probability-weighted 
sum of the individual contents 
 









Now suppose we have the same set of events  n E E E ... , 2 1  and their corresponding 
probabilities() n p p p ,... , 2 1  . Instead of anticipating the gain in information we will receive 
when we learn which event has occurred, this time we receive a message that merely 
causes us to revise our set of probabilities. We denote these new 
probabilities( ) n q q q ... , , 2 1 .  The information gained from this indirect message is simply 
the summed gain (or loss) in the information content of each event  () ( ) i i q h p h −  
weighted by the new (posterior) probabilities.  We can therefore write the expected 
information of the (indirect) message as 
 













q q p I
1
ln :  
 
where  () q p I :  denotes the information content of the message transforming prior 
probabilities p into posterior probabilities q. Here we may draw our parallel between 
information content and inequality measurement. Expression (3) is analogous to Theil’s T 
inequality measure, where the posterior probability  i q  represents the proportion of total   4
income accruing to group i, and prior probability i p  represents the proportion of the total 
population in group i.  We emphasize that this definition for the T measure is compatible 
with the thought experiment in section (1), only in this instance the result is a little more 
general as we allow for the population shares  i p  to vary in size, rather than being 
restricted to being equal to  n / 1 . The index functions extremely well as an inequality 
measure (Cowell, 1981); taking on a value of zero when all income shares are equal to 
their corresponding population shares, and is equal to ) ln( i p  in the perfectly unequal case 
when one group ( i p ) controls all the income.   
 
This derivation of Theil’s T index however contains the implicit assumption that our 
indirect message transforms the population shares i p  into income shares  i q . That is, we 
treat the population shares as the prior probabilities (before the message is received) and 
our income shares as the posterior probabilities (after the message) and thus Theil’s T 
index is interpretable as the information gain as we travel from p to q. In the realm of 
inequality measurement there is no particular reason why this assignment of ‘prior’ and 
‘posterior’ labels should be so and hence the ‘direction’ of the message is arbitrarily 
chosen.  If the income shares are reclassified as prior probabilities and the population 
shares as posterior probabilities we can evaluate the information content of a message 
running the opposite direction.  This can be calculated as  
 













p p q I
1
ln :  
 
which is an expression for Theil’s L inequality index.   There is a distinct asymmetry or 
non-commutativity here, as the information content of a message transforming population 
shares into income shares is notably different from the information content of a message 
transforming the income shares into population shares.  Thus the choice of how we assign 
the labels of prior and posterior to the income and population shares determines the 
measure of inequality to be used.  This may be seen as somewhat unsatisfactory as 
information theory requires us to make a choice on the direction of the message on an 
arbitrary basis, with the specification of the inequality measure as a non-trivial 
consequence.  
 
At this point common practice for the economist is to choose a measure based on some 
other criteria outside the domain of information theory such as the sensitivity of a 
measure to transfers at higher or lower incomes.  There is, however, an alternative 
solution to this problem provided within information theory that is used in diverse fields 
such as statistical classification and signal processing.  When it is unclear which set of 
probabilities should be labeled as prior and posterior, a solution is to calculate the 
information content of indirect messages running both ways rather than arbitrarily 
selecting one or the other. The sum of the expected information content of the two 
messages may then be used as a measure of the distance between the two distributions.  
This metric is variously known as the Symmetrized Kullback-Leibler Divergence,   5
(Kullback and Leibler, 1951), (Kullback, 1983), Symmetric Relative Entropy or the J-
Divergence (Jeffreys, 1946).   The statistic is  
 













p q p q I q p I I
1
ln : :  
 
where I is the inequality index proposed in this paper. This statistic provides a measure of 
the divergence between p and q and does not depend on the assignment of prior or 
posterior probabilities. In the context of inequality measurement it is simply the sum of 
Theil’s T and L statistics from equations (3) and (4).  
 
Alternative specifications of this index applicable to unit record data and continuous 
distributions are easily determined and can be given as 
 



















where Theil’s T and L measures are 
 






































In the continuous case 























































This new technique for the measurement of inequality has some desirable properties 
which are outlined in the next section. As the measure is simply the sum of two 
axiomatically sound inequality indices the proposed measure inherits much of the 
desirable characteristics from Theil’s measures. 
 
 
3. PROPERTIES OF THE NEW MEASURE 
 
The axioms of inequality measurement provide a strict set of criteria for assessing the 
capability of a particular inequality index and are reviewed in this section. It is generally 
accepted that an effective measure must satisfy most of the listed axioms, while the most 
sophisticated techniques are entirely axiomatically sound. Here we review the axioms and 
test our new measure against them. Definitions are taken from Fields and Fei (1978),   6
Foster (1983), Sen (1973), Cowell and Kuga (1981) and Kolm (1976). To illustrate the 
axioms consider the set of distributions  { } 0 : > ∧ ℜ ∈ = i i x x x D   where x is income or 
some other economic variable of interest. Let  + ℜ → x I :  be an inequality measure. The 
definitions are: 
 
Axiom (1)  Symmetry 
 
A symmetric measure considers only the incomes of the individuals being measured such 
that any rearrangements of incomes amongst individuals will leave the measure 
unchanged. Take the distribution D x∈ .  Inequality measure I  is symmetric if 
() ( ) xP I x I =  where P  is any  n n×  permutation matrix
1.  This is analogous to stating 
() () n n x x x I x x x I ,.. , ... , 1 2 2 1 =  for any possible regrouping of x.   
 
Axiom (2)  Scale independence  
 
A measure should be insensitive to proportional changes in the underlying variable 
including changes in the units of measurement.  The inequality measure I  satisfies the 
relativity or scale independence axiom if  ( ) ( ) x I x I λ =   + ℜ ∈ ∀λ  where λ  is an arbitrary 
scaling factor. 
 
Axiom (3)  Population replication 
 
The inequality measure should be invariant to proportional changes in the underlying 
population.  Consider distribution  ' x  which is a proportional replicate of distribution x 
where each element occurs with frequency  f  i.e.  } ,... , ... , ,... { ' 1 2 , 21 1 11 nf n f f x x x x x x x = .  I  
will satisfy the principle of population replication if  ( ) ( ) x I f x I = ;   + Ν ∈ ∀f . 
 
Axiom (4)  Pigou-Dalton transfer principle 
 
The Pigou-Dalton transfer principle requires that any order preserving transfer of income 
from a higher to a lower income earner must reduce the inequality measure.   ) (x I  will 
satisfy the transfer principle if   ( ) 0 < x Tji  for  j i x x <  where it exists and    
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Axiom (5)  Decomposability 
 
Consider a partition of x into k subgroups such that each subgroup  j x  has  1 ≥ j n  







. We also define  n n p j j / =  and refer 
                                                 
1 A matrix which may be constructed from any permutation of the rows and columns of an  n n×  identity 
matrix.   7
to this as the population share of group j, while  j q  is the proportion of total income 
earned by group j. The inequality index I  is decomposable if it may be written as a 
function of the within-subgroup  and between-subgroup inequalities. 
Here () k k k n n n I I I f I ,... , , ,... , , ,... , 2 1 2 1 2 1 μ μ μ =  where  j μ  is the mean income level of 
partition j and  j I is the inequality measured within j x . 
 
Axiom (6)  Principle of diminishing transfers 
 
The principle of diminishing transfers requires that a progressive transfer (from a higher 
to a lower income earner) should have a diminishing effect at higher income levels.  The 
example given by Kolm (1976) says a small transfer from an individual with an income 
of 900 units to an individual with 500 should reduce inequality less than an equivalent 
transfer from the individual with the income of 500 units to another earning 100 units. 
Using the definition of the transfer principle from axiom (4) the diminishing transfer 
principle may be stated as  () ( ) x T x T lk ji <  where  k l i j x x x x − = −  and  k i x x < . 
 
Proposition 1: The proposed measure satisfies measurement axioms 1-6. 
 
Proof:  We consider each axiom in turn. 
 
Axiom (1) Symmetry:  The measure is symmetric as ) ( ) ( j i x f x f =  ∀  j i x x =  
 
Axiom (2) Scale independence: The measure is insensitive to income scaling factor λ  
since                                    
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Axiom (3) Population replication: Consider a replication of underlying distribution x 
where each  i x  occurs with frequency + ∈N f .  The inequality measure is 
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Axiom (4) Pigou-Dalton transfer principle:  The transfer principle will be satisfied if 
()0 ' ' > i x f   n i ... 1 = .  To see this, consider a progressive transfer of size dx from higher 
income earner j to lower income earner i.   The effect of the transfer on the inequality 
index I with evaluation function  ) (x f  is 
   8
(10)     0
) ( 1 ) ( 1
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 for all  i x . The evaluation 
function ) (x f  and first and second derivatives are: 
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Axiom (5) Decomposability: Various proofs and demonstrations of the decomposition of 
Theil’s T and L measures are given by Theil (1967), Cowell and Kuga (1980), Foster 
(1983), Shorrocks (1980) and Bourguignon (1979). Here we show that the combined 
index is decomposable. We take the index as defined in equation (6) and show it may be 






















may be written as a summation across the set of k subgroups. Here  ij x refers to the ith 
income in group j. There are  j n  individuals in group j with group mean  k μ  and 
∑ = =
k
j j n n
1 . This is 
 
































































This may be written as 
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(19)          ∑∑ ∑∑ ∑



















































































Multiplying the second term by  j j n n /  gives 
 
(20)    ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
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where  j p is the population share of group j,  j L is the inequality within j and  B L  is the 










j j j i x
ln ln  we get 
 














































With some algebra we get 
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(25)               ∑∑ ∑ ∑
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 and invoking 
similar definitions as used in equation (20) we can write 
 
(26)                                    () () ∑
=
+ + + =
k
j




Thus the decomposition of the proposed index requires that the measure of inequality 
within subgroup j can be written as  j j j L T I + =  where  j T  and  j L  are Theil’s inequality 
indices.  That is, we must be able to separate each within-group inequality estimate 
k I into contributions 
k T  and 
k L  as each receives a different weighting for the 
decomposition of the index. It should be noted that this decomposition is somewhat 
messier than the standard GE decomposition due to the required separation of T and L 
and a more complex weighting system required to reconstruct the original measure. This 
messiness may be seen as a disadvantage of this technique.  
 
Axiom (6) Diminishing transfers:  I  will satisfy the diminishing transfer principle if 
() () x T x T lk ji <  where  l k i j x x x x − = −  and  k i x x < .  We can write  
 
















+ − = −
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 for all x.  It is simple to verify that  
(28)      0









           0 > x  
 
and thus the measure satisfies the diminishing transfer axiom. 
 
 
4. AN ALTERNATIVE FORM OF DECOMPOSITION 
 
In this section we discuss an alternative method for analyzing an inequality metric.  The 
proposed method is henceforth referred to as a ‘dissection’ or ‘disaggregation’ to   11
distinguish it from the standard method typical of GE measures where inequality is 
decomposed into within-group and between-group factors. As we shall see the proposed 
measure is well suited to this alternative disaggregation analysis. 
 
Suppose we take distribution x and calculate an inequality metric of the form 





i x f n x I
1
; / 1 μ  where the choice of ( ) μ ; x f  determines the particular index. 
Though the index I is a functional of x it may be of interest to ask what interpretation 
may be placed upon the individual component( ) ( ) μ ; / 1 i x f n  and what may be inferred 
from this component about the underlying income level i x . As we are considering 
measures where the components are aggregated to determine the inequality metric, we 
suggest that under certain conditions it is reasonable to interpret ( )( ) μ ; / 1 i x f n  as the 
contribution of income  i x  to the index ( ) x I . To be able to place this interpretation upon 
() ( ) μ ; / 1 i x f n  however, we require some guidance as to what we believe an individual’s 
‘contribution to inequality’ should represent. In this paper we propose that the 
contribution an individual makes to inequality should be a non-negative reflection of the 
extremeness of that person’s income level, such that persons with both low and high 
incomes make significant positive contributions which increase as incomes diverge 
further from the mean. Analogously persons with middling incomes should contribute 
less to inequality, and persons earning the exact mean income level should make a 
contribution of zero. In other words, if our inequality measure is the simply the sum (or 
average) of a scoring system which penalizes distributions for containing both low and 
high income levels; where the penalty for each income is directly observable, we suggest 
that each ‘penalty’ may represent the contribution of that income to the overall index. 
 
This system implies two conditions for the index: 
 





x f n x I
1
; / 1 μ  such that the 
 individual  components  ( ) μ ; i x f  are tractable. 
 
(II)  That  () 0 ≥ x f  for all x,  ( ) 0 = μ f ,  ( ) 0 ' > x f  for  μ < x  and  () 0 ' > x f  for 
μ > x . 
 
The Relative Mean Deviation index satisfies these conditions and provides a good 
example of the concept. The measure is 
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2 It should be noted that despite this attractive characteristic, this index makes a poor inequality measure as 
it is insensitive to transfers that do not cross the mean and thus fails the transfer axiom.     12
and is simply the average of the mean-standardized difference between each income and 
the average income.  Here an individual earning the mean income level would have an 
individual component of zero and contribute nothing to the measured inequality, while 
the further an income moved away from the mean, either above or below, the greater that 
person’s contribution.  An advantage of using the Relative Mean Deviation or other 
measure which exhibits this property is that we may group together individuals in any 
arbitrary way into k exhaustive subgroups and observe the extent to which each subgroup, 
on average, contributes to the index. Thus we may write the index as 
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μ   as the average contribution of subgroup j to the index 








;μ  is the total contribution for this group.  These subgroup contributions 
give a reflection of the overall ‘extremeness’ of the group incomes, such that a group 
where every individual has a middling income will have an average of contribution of 
zero; and for any group, the average will always increase whenever any of the group 
incomes move away from the mean. We give these group averages the same 
interpretation as for the individual as the extent to which a particular subgroup 
contributes to the overall inequality measurement.  Examples of such interpretations 
could be ‘The lowest earning 10% of the income distribution drive 30% of measured 
inequality’ or ‘Persons from group A contribute twice as much to inequality, per person, 
than individuals from subgroup B’.  
 
In the context of this group averaging process the motivation behind the non-negativity 
constraint for  () μ ; x f  in condition (II) becomes apparent.  Measures which assign 
components that can be either positive or negative typically do relative to the mean of the 
distribution
3, where the sign of the components switches as incomes cross the sample 
average. This is problematic for our ‘extremeness’ interpretation as an offsetting effect 
will occur when some individuals within a subgroup lie on either side of the mean. 
Consider an example where we wish to interpret a subgroup component average for a 
group containing mostly low income earners, but where one individual from the group 
earns a spectacularly high income. We may ask ‘should the presence of the high income 
earner increase or decrease the extent to which the subgroup, on average, contributes to 
the overall inequality estimate?’ 
 
If we feel that the presence of this very high income reduces the extent to which the 
subgroup contributes to inequality we should use a measure that assigns both positive and 
negative components, as the inclusion of the high income earner will offset the 
components from lower income earners. This will ensure that the group average 
                                                 
3 Such as GE indices given in equation (31)   13
component is reduced, and gives a rough representation of the relative average income of 
the subgroup. It is argued here however that the average extremeness of the incomes 
within a subgroup is more interesting and gives a better measure of the extent to which 
the subgroup contributes to overall inequality. As the presence of the solitary high 
income earner increases the extremeness of incomes within the group his or her presence 
should increase rather than decrease the group average contribution. Thus if we agree 
with the interpretation that a person’s contribution to inequality is driven by the 
extremeness of the underlying income it is necessary to ensure that each component 
reflects the extremeness of the individual income in an absolute sense for the 
disaggregation of the inequality estimate to be meaningful. 
 
This argument is well illustrated by examining plots of the evaluation functions of certain 
measures.  Here we provide evaluation functions for Theil’s measures and the proposed 
index. The evaluation functions for these measures are taken from equations (6)-(7). 
 
 
Figure 1. Evaluation function for Theil’s T index 
 
 
An examination of Figure 1 for Theil’s T index
4 reveals the difficulty in interpreting a 
subgroup average of () μ ; x f  across multiple  ij x  as the extent to which the subgroup 
drives overall inequality.  An average component of zero may occur with i. all  0 = ij x , ii. 
all  μ = ij x  or iii. some  μ < ij x  and other  μ > ij x . As it seems reasonable to conclude that 
these groups should contribute differently to the overall inequality estimate these 
subgroup averages may not be interpreted as a group contribution in the manner 
suggested. 
 
                                                 
4 We note that other formulations for Theil’s T index exist, however this functional form seems to be the 
most widely presented.  Similar arguments may be applied to other expressions for this measure.   14
 
Figure 2. Evaluation function for Theil’s L index 
 
 
A similar argument can be made concerning Theil’s L measure.  A subgroup where each 
μ = ij x  can have the same average component as a subgroup where some  μ < ij x  and 
other  μ > ij x . Thus in some instances a group average may increase as one income 
moves further away from the mean while in other cases this action will decrease the 
group average, depending on the incomes of other members of the subgroup. 
 




   15
 
The evaluation function for the new measure demonstrates the capability of this index for 
the proposed from of disaggregation. Each income level  i x  gives a contribution to the 
index proportional to () μ ; i x f  such that extreme incomes contribute greatly and incomes 
that congregate around the mean contribute less. A group average of  () μ ; i x f  across 
multiple  i x  will always increase if any income moves further away from the mean and 
thus provides an acceptable measurement of the extent to which the subgroup drives the 
overall inequality metric.  
 
Though it may be seen that many of the simpler ad hoc inequality indices such as the 
Relative Mean Deviation satisfy conditions (I) and (II) the property is unusual in more 
sophisticated measures.  
 
Proposition 2: No existing axiomatically complete (GE) index satisfies condition (II). 
 
Proof: Cowell (1981) and Foster (1983) show that the only axiomatically complete 
measures belong to the family of Generalized Entropy measures.  This class of index is 
usually given as 
 







































where the parameter α  dictates the sensitivity of the measure at higher and lower ends of 
the distribution. Formulations of Theil’s L and T inequality measures may be derived as 
special cases of this class by taking the limits of equation (6) as  0 → α  and  1 → α  
respectively.  It is straightforward to see that the component 
 


































x f  when  μ > i x  and  1 > α  or   μ < i x  and  1 < α  
 
and that the sign may be reversed by switching either but not both of the required 
inequalities. The measure will therefore assign both positive and negative components, 
making it unsuitable for the proposed analysis. In the special cases of Theil’s T and L 
measures a similar argument may be used.  The T index with evaluation function  
 










x f ln ; 
 
is shown in Figure 1 and is negative when  μ < i x  and positive when  μ > i x . The 
evaluation function for Theil’s L measure is plotted in Figure 2 and is given as 
   16










x f ln ; 
 
This function is positive when  μ < i x  and negative when  μ > i x  and thus does not 
satisfy condition II. 
 
Should α  be set to two the GE equation yields a measure equal to half the square of the 
coefficient of Variation and may be written in a form consistent with conditions (1) and 
(2).  It should be noted however that the index is not axiomatically complete as it fails the 
diminishing transfer principle (axiom 6).  For a GE measure to satisfy this axiom it is 
required that  2 < α . 
 
 
5. RECONCILING THE NEW FORM OF DISSAGREGATION WITH 
BETWEEN-GROUP AND WITHIN-GROUP INEQUALITY DECOMPOSITION 
 
  
The proposed form of disaggregation is somewhat similar to the separation of inequality 
into within-group and between group factors typical of GE measures. The two techniques 
share a direct relationship, such that if we know the income and population shares of each 
group, the within and between-group inequalities and can separate these inequalities into 
k T  and 
k L we can determine the contribution of each subgroup to the inequality metric as 

























It follows from the proof of axiom (5) that group contribution 
c
j I  may be determined as 
 

























Furthermore it is straightforward to show that the estimates of within-group inequalities 
for the new measure are equal to the subgroup contributions in the special case where the 
between-group inequality is equal to zero. Suppose each  j j p q =  i.e. there is no between-
group inequality and all variation occurs within the subgroups.  It is easy to see that (35) 
becomes 
 
(36)                                                       j j
c
j L T I + =  
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which is simply the definition for the inequality within j. Thus the suggest form of 
decomposition is closely related to the standard method. The difference is that the 
standard method calculates within-group inequalities relative to each group mean, while 
the proposed method calculates group contributions relative to the overall sample mean. 
 
6. AN EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION 
 
In this section we provide an empirical demonstration of the new measure using U.S. 
census data taken from the IPUMS (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series 
http://usa.ipums.org/usa/) website.  The 1-in-100 ACS (American Community Survey) 
dataset is used and we take the pre-tax wage and salary earnings of 1,496,561 individuals 
with non-zero incomes during 2007 to analyze U.S income inequality.  We estimate the 
Theil L index to be equal to 0.581322 and Theil’s T index at 0.46329 for the inequality 
within this dataset, with the proposed measure equal to the sum of these two estimates at 
1.04462.  By dissagregating the new index using equation (30) we can determine how 
much each racial group
5 drives the inequality measure. The results are in the table below. 
 
Table 1. Racial contributions to inequality in the United States 
Racial Group  Average Component  Population share  Ave comp × Pop Share
White 1.08505  0.75595  0.82024 
Black/Negro 0.88216  0.11500  0.10145 
Native 0.99309  0.00721  0.00716 
Chinese 1.22825  0.01048  0.01287 
Japanese 1.31612  0.00266  0.00350 
Other Asian  1.08885  0.03377  0.03677 
Other Race  0.76372  0.05904  0.04509 
Two Races  1.10178  0.01480  0.01630 
Three Races  1.12011  0.00110  0.00123 
Total  -  1 1.04462 
 
The first column of this table gives the average component of each subgroup calculated 
























.  By weighting these averages with the 
population shares given in column two and summing them we can reconcile these group 
contributions with our overall inequality estimate.  We can observe the extent to which 
each racial group drives this inequality statistic by the size of the average component or 
‘extremeness’ of each group. Subgroups such as ‘Chinese’ and ‘Japanese’ have higher 
average components than the total population average and therefore contain relatively 
more extreme incomes than the population as a whole.  Conversely persons of 
‘Black/Negro’ or ‘Native’ racial groups earn more middling incomes and make lower 
contributions to inequality than other groups. The racial group ‘White’ makes up the 
majority of the population share and persons within this group earn slightly more extreme 
                                                 
5 The racial labels in Table 1 are somewhat broad and more detail may be found on the IPUMS website.  
The racial group ‘Native’ for example contains persons of both Native Indian and Native Alaskan decent, 
while the group ‘Other Asian’ includes Pacific Islanders.   18
incomes ( 08505 . 1 =
c
Whit I ) than the total population ( 04462 . 1 = I ).  It is worth 
emphasizing here that any subgroup in which every individual earned mean income level 
μ would have an average component of zero.   
 
To distinguish these estimates from the within-group and between-group inequality 
estimates typical of GE measures we present these results for the inequality between and 
within our racial groups using our new measure.  The results are in the table below. 
 
Table 2. Inequalities within and between racial groups 
Racial Group  Within Group  Between Component  Within Group (W)  Total 
White 1.05495  0.00243  0.81782  - 
Black/Negro 0.90634  0.00778  0.09367  - 
Native 1.00940  0.00082  0.00633  - 
Chinese 1.05852 0.00058  0.01229  - 
Japanese 0.97861  0.00041  0.00309 - 
Other Asian  0.99738  0.00076  0.03601  - 
Other Race  0.74394  0.00739  0.03770  - 
Two Races  1.15439  0.00071  0.01550  - 
Three Races  1.17145  4.1E-05  0.00119  - 
Total    0.02093 1.02369  1.04462 
 
The first column gives the inequality estimate for the distribution of income within each 
racial group, while the second gives the group components to be aggregated to determine 
the inequality between the subgroups. The third column gives the within-group 
inequalities after they have been weighted by population and income shares as per 
equation (20), and the last column shows that total inequality may be reconciled using the 
within-group and between-group inequality estimates. 
 
A cursory inspection of Table 2 reveals that some groups with high internal inequality 
such as ‘Chinese’, ‘Two races’ and ‘Three Races’ also had high average contributions in 
Table 1, while other groups with lower within-group inequality had lower group 
contributions (an exception is the subgroup ‘Japanese’). To contrast these different 
methods of analyzing inequality we reemphasize that each within-group inequality is 
calculated relative to each group mean, while each racial group contribution from Table 1 
is calculated with respect to the population mean rather than each specific group mean.  
 
The similarity between these associated estimates for each group in the two tables may be 
explained by the low between-group inequality figure from Table 2.  This estimate 
indicates there is little variation between the average incomes in each subgroup; hence 
the differences between the within-group inequalities calculated relative to each subgroup 
mean and the group contributions calculated relative to the single population mean are 
likely to be small. Should the average incomes of each subgroup become completely 
equalized across the groups, we would observe the between-group inequality estimate 
from Table 2 vanishing to zero and the within-subgroup inequalities converging to the 
group contributions from Table 1. Conversely, we would expect to see large differences   19
between each within-group inequality estimate and the corresponding subgroup 
contribution when the between-group inequality is high.  Consider the example of a 
population containing an extravagantly wealthy subgroup with homogenous incomes.   
The inequality within this high earning subgroup is zero; however the average component 
of the group must be large as the underlying incomes are extreme relative to the 
population mean.  Such a situation can only occur when there is a degree of between-
group inequality and is somewhat illustrated by the case of the racial group ‘Japanese’. 
The internal inequality of this subgroup is lower than most other groups, but due to an 





This paper re-explores the link between inequality measurement and information theory.  
We show that the parallels between these concepts may be extended such that a new and 
attractive inequality index may be determined.  The index exists in other fields of 
statistics and is referred to as the symmetrized Kullback-Liebler divergence, Symmetric 
Relative Entropy or J-Divergence.  We show that the measure satisfies the axioms of 
measurement and possesses an intuitive disaggregation property which allows for the 
contribution of each income or subgroup to total inequality to be directly observable.  
The new measure is demonstrated with unit record data from the U.S. and we determine 
the average contribution to inequality of a range of racial subgroups. It was found that the 
incomes of U.S wage earners belonging to racial groups defined as ‘Chinese’, ‘Japanese’ 
or ‘Three Races’ are on average much more extreme than the entire population, while the 
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